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COMPETITION POLICY FOR AN
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Any effort to achieve substantial North American economic integration must
account for and reconcile the varying policies toward competition among the par-
ticipant countries. Such an undertaking requires at the outset the resolution of
two issues fundamental to economic policy. First, there must be a choice between
market and nonmarket systems of organizing the major sectors of the economy.
Second, if a market system is chosen, there must be a choice of the degree and
method of controlling and directing the market. The alternatives (not entirely
mutually exclusive) range from no control beyond that which inheres in such gen-
eral law as that of contract, to direct performance-oriented control such as specific
safety or wage and price controls, to indirect market structure and conduct regula-
tions which seek to achieve social objectives by perfecting the conduct of market
activity.
Assuming that markets emerge as important organizing forces for economic
activity and that regulation of competition is a primary means of controlling mar-
ket behavior, there is still a wide variety of specific choices in implementing such a
competitive policy. The primary emphasis of this article is on identifying the
choices that the United States, Mexico and Canada have made, and to propose
ways in which those choices could be reconciled.
The first section of this article explores briefly the relative roles which America,
Canada and Mexico assign to market and nonmarket economic activity and the
choices these countries have made between direct regulation of market activity
and the indirect regulation which antitrust law provides. The second section ex-
amines the substantive law of competition as it exists in the three countries and
suggests possible ways to reconcile the differing choices that emerge. The final
section deals with the most difficult problems of antitrust policy: enforcement
methods including the role of private litigation, and the jurisdictional and preemp-
tion questions that arise among the participant countries.
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1. For a fuller discussion of the choices see C. LINDBLOM, POI TI C:S AND MARKE.Ts (1977).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
I
THE ROLE OF THE MARKET IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY AND THE
METHODS OF REGULATING MARKET ACTIVITY
All three countries employ the market as the basic tool for organizing most
productive economic activity. Consequently nonmarket, economic activity is a
small sector of the three economies. 2
The choice of market over other methods of economic allocation does not mean
that ownership of enterprises cannot be in public or cooperative entities.:' A mar-
ket approach implies only that buyers and sellers, interacting in a market, however
structured, play a substantial role in economic decision-making through voluntary
transactions.
All three countries have publicly and cooperatively owned business enterprises.
Mexico has the largest concentration of public ownership with some sectors (e.g.,
petroleum) 4 almost entirely so controlled, while other sectors (e.g. , steel) -' have sub-
stantial and growing private sectors. Canada also has a large and expanding pub-
licly owned sector. Through its investment board Canada has purchased control
of a number of corporations doing business in that country. 6 The Canadian gov-
ernment is presently proposing to obtain significant ownership interests in the do-
mestic petroleum industry.7 Several Canadian provinces have also begun to
acquire enterprises." The scope of public ownership in the United States is much
less, but many public utility enterprises are publicly owned (e.g., The Tennessee
Valley Authority). A few states also own business enterprises. 9
All three countries exercise some control over the right of foreigners to own
businesses. Both Mexico and Canada have fairly general controls. ") The Ameri-
can restrictions historically have focused upon specific industries (e.g., telecommu-
2. Some significant nonmarket activity exists in all three economies. Thus, provision of, e.g., educa-
tion, some forms of health care, and basic municipal services, occurs on a basis independent of market
demand. Political decisions determine the level of output and the allocation of the resulting supply.
3. In general, even when an industry is publicly owned, market demand sets its production level and
allocates that production among consumers. Similarly, inputs are obtained in market transactions which
require the payment of market price. To be sure subsidies, tax breaks, etc., can and will affect the prices of
both inputs and outputs. Such fiddling with the market system is in no way a rejection of or substitution
for the market, however much it may be a distortion of it. Rather, such conduct rests on the premise that
the objective is to encourage (or discourage) voluntary market transactions which are mutually satisfactory
to the parties.
4. Law for the Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Investment, ch. 1,
art. 4(a) and (b) (English translation in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEvEI.OPMENT,
CONTROL OF RESTRICrIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA ADDENDUM 124-33 (1975)) [herein-
after cited as Foreign Investment Code.
5. Bennett & Sharpe, The State as Banker and Enlrepenuer, 12 COMP. POL. 165, 176-77 (1980).
6. See, e.g., Texasgulf Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
7. See Urquhardt, Nationahlim in Ottawa Perils 1.US Investment in Energy, Other Areas, Wall St. J., Feb. 18,
1981, at 1, col. 6; Meyer, Trudeau's War on U.S Business, FORTUNE Apr. 6, 1981, at 74.
8. Quebec, e.g., has recently received final judical clearance to take over the assets in Quebec of Asbes-
tos Corp., Wall St. J., March 18, 1981, at 48, col. 4.
9. An example is the Bank of North Dakota. See Allardice, State-Owned Banks.- New Winefor Old Bo/tlej,
in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CIIICA(;O, BUSINESS CONDITIONS 3 (July 1976).
10. Se Foreign Investment Code, supra note 4 (Mexican law); Foreign Investment Review Act, ch. 46,
(Acts of Parliament, 1st Sess. 29th Parliament (1974) (Canadian law) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Invest-
ment Act]. See also Meyer, supra note 7.
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nications), where public interest concerns were greatest.II All three countries also
share a common perspective that the government must regulate the market in
some way. This commitment and its implementation are strongest in the United
States and Mexico.
Canada, while professing to regulate competition, employs statutes demonstra-
bly ineffective for that task. 12 In consequence, significant anticompetitive behav-
ior has occurred, sometimes aided by public officials.13 Moreover, the Canadian
government has not undertaken pervasive performance regulation of the market.
The United States has the strongest commitment to regulation of its market via
indirect methods. Its antitrust laws cover almost all major aspects of market be-
havior. While such market structuring regulation is the preferred American alter-
native, it is not the only method employed. For instance, there is substantial
performance regulation. Some is aimed at industries such as public utilities, which
are assumed to be monopolistic and hence not amenable to competitive interac-
tion. Other regulation controls competitive markets for matters in which the as-
sumption is, implicitly or explicitly, that market transactions will not produce
socially desirable outcomes. Such regulation ranges from environmental controls
to the conditions of warranties for consumer goods. 14 Controls over wages and
prices have been implemented in wartime and again during the early 1970s.1'5 The
rationale for such controls is that, under some conditions (e.g., war), the market
cannot handle its allocation tasks because of massive disequalibrium, or that the
expected competitive limitation on exploitation of market position did not occur
because of market failures of one kind or another. 16
The Mexican market economy is the object of substantial performance regula-
tion, especially regarding prices. 17 At the same time, the Mexican Constitution
both prohibits private monopoly and market control and endorses the ideal of
competitive market conduct and structure.' The statute' 9 which implements this
11. 47 U.S.C. § 310 (1962 & Supp. 1981) (no ownership of radio or television stations).
12. See CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY: ESSAYS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (J. Prichard, W. Stan-
bury, T. Wilson, eds. 1979) [hereinafter cited as CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY].
13. United States v. AMAX, Inc., 1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 61,467 (D.C. Ill. 1977) (price fixing in
potash not illegal because done at behest of Saskatchewan government). Cf In Re Uranium Antitrust
Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 n.21. (7th Cir. 1979).
14. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act of 1975, Pub. L. #93-637, 88 Stat. 2183 (current version at 15
U.S.C. § 45 el seq., (1976)); Environmental Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224, 84 Stat.
114, 42 U.S.C. § 4371 et seq. Cf Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liabit/ in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90
YALE L. J. I (1980) (recommending that the control of corporate organizations be accorded the concen-
trated attention of an independent field of law).
15. E. REDFORD, ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONTROL (1952); R. LANZII.LEnTI, M.
HAMILTON, R. ROBERTS, PHASE II IN REVIEW; THE PRICE COMMISSION EXPERIENCE (1975). See also 12
U.S.C.A. § 1904 note.
16. See Carstensen, Antist Law, Competition, and the Macroeconomy, 14 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 173 (1981).
17. Bennett & Sharpe, supra note 5, at 179. E. WHITE, CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRAC-
TICES IN LATIN AMERICA 31 (1975).
18. Constitution of Mexico, Art. 28 (English translation in 9 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF
THE WORLD Mexico-16 (A. Blaustein, G. Flanz eds. 1980)) [hereinafter cited as Mexican Constitution].
19. Organic Law Implementing Article 28 of the Constitution Concerning Monopolies (Aug. 31,
1934) (English translation, as amended in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DE"EvLOP-
MENT, CONTROL OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA ADDENDUM 58-62 (1975)) Ihere-
inafter cited as Mexican Monopoly Law].
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provision appears to be largely unenforced; 20 however, other economic regulations
reflect a concern for a competitive market context for private economic activity.2 1
While the three countries substantially agree on the primacy of the market as
the means to organize economic activity, the consensus favoring an indirectly regu-
lated and competitive market over a market whose ultimate performance is di-
rectly controlled, (or over no regulation) is less strong. Two arguments
independently support a conclusion that perfecting the competitiveness of markets
ought to be the primary approach to any policy of economic integration.
First, based on historic experience, a competitive market, pushed or pulled by
subsidy, protection and supplemental regulation of specific transactional concerns,
has proven to be the most efficient and effective way to organize economic forces.22
Such a market frees private will to act and react so that hope of private gain will
induce desired economic activity. 21
The second basis for preferring competition as the primary policy objective is
that, in seeking economic integration of three quite different economies at different
stages of economic development, a great deal of decision-making will have to re-
main at the national level. Such national decisions can more easily fit into an
overall context of competition among enterprises in the three economies than can
fit into a collective performance-regulating scheme which seeks to control specific
outcomes in markets.
Such a competitive market cannot exist, however, without affirmative govern-
ment action. At the very least, courts must be told when and how restrictive con-
tracts may or may not be enforced. The corporation is a legal creation. All its
actions, especially merger, can occur only because government gives it the legal
right. More comprehensively, the legal system makes choices, consciously or not,
to create and to limit legal rights. Those choices must inherently affect the degree
of competition which occurs in the market. Consequently, if a competitive market
is the objective sought, the law must be developed in ways consistent with that
objective.
These arguments point toward an overall policy which seeks to promote and
maximize competition in the context of economic integration. In general, the
more procompetitive a solution is, the more it should be favored, provided it also
substantially achieves its other objectives. Promoting competition directly, only to
frustrate it unnecessarily by other policies, is unproductive. This is not to say that,
in developing environmental or consumer protection policy, some competitive ef-
fect will not occur. Rather it is to urge that such effects be taken into account, and
20. E. WHITE, supra note 17.
21. See Foreign Investment Code, supra note 4, especially art. 13; Law of 28 December 1972 Concern-
ing Registration of Transfer of Technology and the Use and Working of Patents, Trade-Names and Trade-
Marks (English translation in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AN) DiVEIiOPMENT. CONT[ROt.
OF RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA ADDENDUM 173-76 (1975)) [hereinafter cited as
Technology Transfer Law]; see also, Note, United Slates Anlitrust Laws and Afexizan Foreig Ives/men/ Lai.s: A
'omnparahie Survey, 13 Hous'r. L. REV. 571 (1976); E. WtIITE, supra note 17.
22. C. LINDBLOM, supra note I.
23. J. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDX)M IN ItE NINETLENI it-CENTUR UNITED
STATES (1956).
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that alternatives be sought which achieve the maximum in competition while serv-
ing the primary objective.
A second policy implication beyond the specific scope of this discussion is that
an important objective in integrating economic activities should be the perfection
of markets which are presently not functioning as efficiently as possible.24 Such
market-perfecting regulation includes information disclosure requirements (so that
buyers can make informed judgments) and market-organizing regulation, which
acts to create sufficiently large or informed buyers or sellers.
II
THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF COMPETITION
Substantive law of competition is divisible into three basic areas: monopoly,
restrictive conduct and merger. The following subsections consider each of those
subject areas.
A. Monopoly
The acquisition or retention of a monopoly position in any line of business
creates grave risks to the efficient operation of a competitive market system. A
monopoly unfettered by the contraints of the market is free to set price, quality
and output to serve its own interest. It affects both present efficient use of re-
sources by charging excessive prices, and future development of an economy by its
efforts to entrench and protect its position.
The creation and maintenance of monopoly can involve conduct aimed at de-
stroying actual or potential competitors by means other than acceptable competi-
tion. In addition, in seeking to maximize monopoly profit or entrench its position,
a monopolist may inflict unnecessary harm on firms operating in other related
markets. At the same time, the hope of a monopoly is a lure that induces invest-
ment, invention and desirable competitive activity, as the patent laws illustrate.
Consequently, an inherent tension exists in the law governing monopoly between a
desire to be rid of monopoly and a recognition that much monopoly is either desir-
able or, at least, unavoidable. The current state of monopoly law in Canada, Mex-
ico and the United States provides some indication of the difficulties in finding a
suitable resolution to that tension.
American law seeks both to eliminate monopolistic structural conditions and to
forbid undersirable monopolistic conduct.2 5 In broad brush strokes, the American
rules governing monopolistic conduct regulate three aspects of monopolistic be-
havior: (1) the use of existing monopoly power to obtain a position in another
market, (2) the exploitation of monopoly power to achieve monopoly profits, and
(3) the scope of permissible conduct in defending or acquiring a monopoly posi-
tion. In general, a monopolist may not use its monopoly position directly to
24. Cy Reich, Toward a New Consumer Pro/ectton, 128 U. PA. L. REV. I (1979).
25. A part of the problem in American law may be that a single statutory provision, Section 2 of tile
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) provides the legal basis for both structural and conduct cases despite
the substantial differences between the specific legal theories and the remedies that are involved.
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achieve a position in another market. 26 A firm with a not unlawful monopoly is
generally free to charge whatever it wishes for goods or services over which it has a
monopoly; 27 it may not, however, exploit its market power in ways which directly
affect competition in other markets. 28 The hardest set of rules to define govern the
rights of firms to engage in conduct which creates or protects a monopoly. Some
situations are clear, e.g., excluding a competitor by compelling a boycott. 29 Such
situations involve the use of market power only to cause harm to others. When a
monopolist responds to new competition with price cuts or other traditionally
competitive conduct, deciding whether and when such conduct is wrongful is very
difficult. Given its existing or potential power in the market, a monopolist has an
incentive to protect its position through intensely competitive conduct only be-
cause of the expected future dominance and exploitation of the market. Such con-
duct, while competitive on its face, is not reasonable in competitive terms. On the
other hand, any rule which substantially restricts the freedom of a monopolist to
compete can create an undesirable "umbrella" over inefficient competitors and
deny the economy the advantages of competition. :0 Consequently, efforts to de-
fine "predatory" practices have not achieved consistent results or rules.:1
The second line of American legal development, elimination of structural mo-
nopoly, has sought to define criteria under which a firm with a monopoly position
may be dissolved. Two theories of liability have emerged. One requires proof of
abusive conduct by a monopoly as a predicate to structural relief.:" 2 Such evidence
may serve a function beyond creating a threshold condition for liability in that it
may demonstrate that the continued existence of a monopoly which has had to
behave in such a way to survive is not economically necessary in efficiency terms.
The second theory holds that possession and conscious retention of monopoly
power are sufficient to constitute a violation.5 : Implicitly, this second approach
also requires that the plaintiff show that a structural remedy is available. It would
make no sense to declare unlawful that which is unremediable.:14
26. This is part of the rationale for tying law. See Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S.
1, 6 (1958). It is also the basis for such decisions as United States v. Gnffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
27. This is most obvious in the case of a clearly lawful monopoly such as a patent. The price charged
for a patented good, however high, will not in itself constitute abuse of the patent. Of course, such prices,
in cases where a monopoly is not per se lawful, may be substantial evidence of monopoly and consequently
a party with such power may itself be an unlawful monopoly. That is a proposition distinct from the
lawfulness of the price charged.
28. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); LaPeyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1966). See Carstensen, Annual Survey of
Antitrust Developments, /976-/977, 35 WASI. & LEE L. REv. I, 38-45 (1978).
29. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
30. See, In re Borden, 92 FTC 669, 817-32 (1978) (Pitofsky, Comm., concurring).
31. The debate over the definitions of predatory pricing is illustrative of the problems. For a compre-
hensive set of citations and useful discussion see McGee, Predatory Prlidng Revisted, 23 J. L. & EcoN. 789
(1980).
32. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341-43 (D.C. Mass. 1953), a]'d
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
33. United States v. Grinnell, Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
34. The recent FTC decision on DuPont's monopoly in titanium dioxide illustrates the confusion
resulting from mixing the abusive conduct theory with the structural theory of monopoly. Although ap-
parently no structural remedy was sought, the complaint counsel relied on the Alcoa and Grinnell cases,
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In both lines of cases it is not easy to determine when a firm has sufficient
market power to be classified as a monopoly. The problem arises because many
firms have some market power, but it is sufficiently limited so that it would be
unfair either to call the firm an unlawful monopoly or to label use of the economic
power as an abuse of monopoly power. The absence of a clear line for division
means that specific cases can involve ad hoc decisions.
Canada has had specific antimonopoly legislation since 1910, but the statute is
a criminal one. 35 Not only does the criminal standard of proof apply, but the
target of the statute is only abuse of monopoly position in a market "either to
create or protect a monopoly position. ' ' 3 6 The efforts to enforce this law have been
few and have frequently resulted in victory for the defendant. 3 Much of the inef-
fectiveness of this law stems from the judicially imposed requirement that there be
proof of specific instances of public detriment. The conscious acquisition of a mo-
nopoly position, not justified by efficiency and achieved by easily reversable
merger, is not an unlawful act. :3 8 Recently, the Canadian Parliament considered
but did not adopt substantial amendments to its antitrust laws which, rtner alia,
would have provided a more effective antimonopoly provision. 39 The proposal
would have both redefined the offense and made it a civil one enforceable through
injunction and dissolution by an administrative agency. 4
The Mexican Constitution of 1917 prohibits private monopoly. 4' The 1934
statute implementing and defining these prohibitions 42 has apparently never been
enforced directly. 4 :3 The intent of the statute is to prohibit possession of monopoly
and its abuse, but its remedy provisions apparently provide only for performance
regulation of a monopolist's prices, output and dealings with third parties and do
not provide for dissolution of a monopoly. 44
Control over monopoly also comes from the laws regulating technology trans-
fer 45 and foreign investment in Mexican industry. 46 Both statutes have protection-
supra note 33, to argue the unlawfulness of the monopoly in the absence of any abuse. The FTC, in
rejecting this argument, went too far in questioning Alcoa and ,rrnndl's validity in true structural cases. In
re DuPont, 96 FTC 650 (1980).
35. Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-23, Part II (as amendced)(1970); Rosenbluth,
M'onopoly and lonopolzalton, in CANADIAN COMPETITION POIACY, supra note 12, at 330-35.
36. Id at 331.
37. Rosenbluth, supra note 35, reports only two monopoly investigations and no prosecutions before
World War II and only seven suits and four additional investigations in the almost three and a half decadcs
since the war.
38. Regina v. K.C. Irving Ltd., 62 D.L.R. (3d) 157, affd, 72 D.L.R. (3d) 83 (1976).
39. See Rosenbluth, supra note 35, at 336-40.
40. It does appear that such remedies exist under the present law despite its overtly criminal charac-
ter. Thus in the Irvzng case, the trial judge, having found a criminal monopolization, ordered divestiture.
Regina v. K.C. Irving Ltd., 45 D.L.R. (3d) 45 (1974) (criminal conviction) 22 C.CC.(2d) 281 (New Bruns.
S.Ct. 1974) (divestiture order), conviction rev'd, 62 D.L.R. (3d) 157 (1975), aft'd, 72 D.L.R. (3d) 821 (1976).
See Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-23, 30(2) (1970).
41. See note 19 supra.
42. Mexican Monopoly Law, supra note 19.
43. E. WIITE, supra note 17, at v.
44. Mexican Monopoly Law, supra note 19, at arts. 7-10.
45. Techology Transfer Law, supra note 21.
46. Foreign Investment Code, supra note 4.
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ist overtones47 whose constitutionality might be questionable, 48 but they also
identify and implement competitive mandates. The technology transfer law treats
such transfers as sales, thereby ensuring the recipient the future right to use the
acquired technology 49 It also restricts sales conditions which would limit future
competition in domestic or international markets, or which would exploit the mo-
nopoly power of the seller in the markets for other goods or services. 50 Consistent
with the performance regulation of the monopoly statute, the Ministry of Industry
and Trade also reviews the fairness of the price charged for such technology).'1
This direct regulation, however, has as an objective the creation of an interna-
tional market in technology which would provide a self-policing quality to prices
for such service. 5
2
The initial question for an integrated North American economy is the scope of
monopoly control. Should such control exist? If so, should it cover only abusive
conduct or should it reach and try to remedy structural monopoly as well? The
laws of Canada, Mexico and the United States are unanimous on the proposition
that monopoly must be subject to legal control. Such a conclusion seems required
by a commitment to the creation and preservation.of a competitive market system.
There is also substantial agreement that efforts to expand monopoly directly into
new markets and to exploit monopoly by conduct affecting other markets are un-
acceptable abuses of monopoly power." All three countries also condemn the use
of predatory conduct to acquire or retain a monopoly. 54 The problem, as Ameri-
can experience illustrates, is in defining predation beyond the obvious cases of
purely anticompetitive conduct. Despite their arbitrariness in some contexts, ex-
plicit rules establishing standards for minimum prices in relation to cost and other
similar situations may be the only way to reach a consensus on this topic. An
important consideration is whether such rules would have a pre-emptive effect
over more restrictive national laws when applied to transactions between coun-
tries.
In evaluating the need for regional rules dealing with structural monopoly, one
factor is the number of significant monopolies amenable to structural remedy
which exist on a regional basis. If the number is small, the existence of merger,
47. Katz,' Alet o t" Import Licensing Stralegyfor Proleclting Import Replacements. An Aspect of Trade Po/ic, and
Plannnrg For Indou.rtr
, 
Development, 33 AM. J. EcoN. & Soc. 381 (1974).
48. See Note, supra note 21, at 572 n. 8 (1976).
49. Camp & Magnon. Recent Developments Under the Mexican Foreign Investment Law and the Iait RegolallT
the Transfer of Technology, 8 LAWVER OF TilE AMERICAS I, 16 (1975).
50. Technology Transfer Law, supra note 21, at art. 7.
51. Id., at art. 7, 11 (if price for technology is "disproportionate, the agreement is void). See Camp &
Magnon, supra note 49, at 17-19.
52. Proof of a prevailing world price for a technology and prices for substitutes will justify specific
prices for licenses. The effect of the collection and presentation of such information is to educate both
regulators and buyers as to alternatives. Camp & Magnon, supra note 49, at 19.
53. This argument rejects the contentions of some that tying and other similar conduct promotes
efficiency. See, e.g., Bowman, 73tng Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L. J. 19 (1957).
The American courts presented with this argument have correctly concluded that any arguable effi-
ciency can in most cases be achieved in other less anticompetitive ways. See e.g. International Salt Co. v.
United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947): IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
54. See notes 26, 28, 29, 36, 45, 46 supra.
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abusive conduct and restraint-of-trade rules may suffice. The most likely sources
of regional monopoly power are the natural resource industries, but these indus-
tries are the ones which both Canada and Mexico propose to control via public
ownership. The establishment of rules governing the means by which such eco-
nomic enterprises, if monopolistic, must interact with customers is probably tolera-
ble to national sensitivity; however, prohibiting monopoly ownership of such
resources is less likely to be acceptable. Yet, national ownership is consistent with
competitive market structure. Multiple entities, each independent of the others,
can exist even if ultimate ownership rests in a national trust. 51 1 Any necessary coor-
dination or regulation can come from an overtly regulatory agency.
From an enforcement perspective, structural relief is frequently the best and
most efficient way to remedy both structural and abusive monopoly. Decrees that
establish anti-abuse standards are frequently either ineffective or cause substantial
inefficiency.5" The very difficulty in defining workable rules to govern predation
suggests the potential utility of an approach which removes the need to solve an
intractable problem. One possible solution would be to authorize a regional
agency which in addition to enforcing its own monopoly controls, could invoke the
law of the nation where a monopolist's assets are situated. Under such a scheme,
assets located in America would be much more vulnerable to a structural remedy
than would those based in Canada or Mexico. This approach has the virtue of an
added remedy which is consistent with the solution which the relevant national
law would have conferred.
B. Restrictive Conduct
Typically, laws governing competition seek to regulate several types of situa-
tions. First, there is conduct which is undesirable whether displayed individually
or collectively, and whether or not the perpetrator has any appreciable market
power. Such offenses include false advertising, deceptive selling practices and
price discrimination. All three countries already have similar rules forbidding
such conduct. 7 Because of their orientation toward final consumers, most of these
rules can remain largely the province of national or local law as long as they apply
equally to all actors in the specific marketplace.
Price discrimination rules may require some greater regional consensus. Both
America and Canada adopted statutes in the 1930s which forbid price discrimina-
tion and which have similar substantive prohibitions.58 Mexican law would
55. The Mexican experience with its general state investments is illustrative. See Bennett & Sharpe,
supra note 5, at 174-179 (state equity investments made through several independent agencies).
56. Cf In re Borden, 92 FTC at 817-32. Especially undesirable are the performance regulating types
of remedy envisaged in the Mexican antitrust statute. See Mexican Monopoly Law, supra note 19, at art.
28. More administrable and less intrusive are decrees which specify when and how a firm may use its
market power.
57. Compare Benitz, Inter-American Legal Developments, 8 LAWYER OF t' E ANIERICAS 399, 433-34
(1976) (summary of recodified Mexican consumer protection laws) with Leafier and Lipson, Consumer Ac-
tions Against Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices: The Private Uses of Federal Trade Commit sion Juzonptudeice, 48
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 521, 524-38, 560-64 (1980) (summary of state and Federal law) and Belobaba, (In/fir
Trade Practices Legislation.- Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection, 15 Osc;OODE HAI.L L. J. 327 (1976).
58. Compare Combines Investigation Act, Can. Rev. Stat. c. C-23 § 34 (1970) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 13,
COMPETITION POICY
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
appear to share a similar general rejection of price differences not cost justified."'9
Given these national laws, the question remains whether price differences between
national markets ought to be the object of regional concern. To the extent that
such conduct attempts to protect or create monopoly, standards created for the
control of monopoly conduct would apply. Even where monopoly is not a possible
outcome, conduct which exploits differing market demand can produce negative
effects on both consumers who pay higher prices and competitors who confront
lower prices. Yet, such price variances are crucial signals to the market to direct
the allocation of production and investment. For this reason economic logic com-
mands that neither price differences alone be condemned nor regionwide price
uniformity (adjusted for transit and other cost variances) be required.
Logically, the role of price in a market economy suggests that price differences
ought not to be objectionable unless the difference is likely to cause significant
anticompetitive effect to competitors, customers or suppliers of the firm engaging
in this conduct. This approach, already employed in American and Canadian
law, acts to constrain the pricing freedom of firms to ensure that they do not inflict
gratuitous economic harm on others as they respond to supply and demand
changes in the market.
The second major category of conduct is that which is objectionable because it
is the result of collective action. This is classically referred to as contract, combina-
tion or conspiracy in restraint of trade. Such combinations may have two quite
different functions with respect to restraint. They may aim at creating or preserv-
ing market power by collective action aimed at destroying the competitive capac-
ity of third parties. (This may be called collective predation.) Alternatively,
combinations may aim to exploit, for the benefit of the participants, market power
which those participants have already created individually or collectively. (This
may be called exploitative conduct.) Combinations may engage in both types of
conduct.
A second distinction among collective actions is often useful. Some collective
conduct involves only attempts to achieve or exploit power, nothing more. Thus,
two or more competitors might agree to divide a market, freeing each from compe-
tition. Alternatively, such conduct can involve, at least arguably, an effort to
achieve some objective in addition to that of restraint; such restraint is, at least in
part, a functional incident to the achieving of that primary goal. All such agree-
ments constitute restraints, but their function is arguably quite different. The ju-
risprudential utility of this distinction is that, whereas the reasonableness of the
first class of restraint (pure or naked restraint of trade) is determinable only by
reference to the reasonableness of the end result (a diminution of competition), the
13a (1936). The Canadian law is only criminal while the American law is both civil and criminal. Section
2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13, condemns conduct only civilly while Section 3, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13a, is on its face criminal, but is enforceable civilly both in private actions, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14 & 21 (dam-
ages and injunctions), and in government civil suits, 15 U.S.C. § 20. See Comment, Resale Price Maintenance
in Canada andthe United States, 4 TEX INT'L L. F. 156 (1968); Thompson, Resale I+ice Maintenance and Refisa/to
Sell: Aspects of -roblemn in Compettiwn Robey, 21 U. TORONTO L. J. 67 (1971).
59. Technology Transfer Law, supra note 21, at art. 7; cf Mexican Monopoly Law, supra note 19, at
art. 5(ii).
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reasonableness of the second class (ancillary restraints) is measurable by reference
to the need for the restraint to achieve the primary objective. Thus, in this second
class of cases, a court can make a focused factual examination of the relationship
between restraint and objective and inquire whether some lesser degree of restraint
could have achieved the same primary objective. Employing this kind of analysis
provides a consistent method of weighing competitive policy against specific effi-
ciency justifications for suppressing competition in particular instances. By way of
contrast, there is no consistent standard for judging the reasonableness of the first
category of restraint. 60
The American approach to collective restraint is stringent. The law applies to
all agreements to restrain without regard to effect.6 I All naked restraints, of which
cartels are one illustration, are illegal per se.6 2 American courts have gone beyond
this rule to condemn as presumptively illegal combinations which had apparent
ancillary defenses. 6 3 Recent decisions have retreated and extended the reasonable-
ness test to more instances,6 4 but in at least some situations the presumption of
illegality remains.65 American courts have, however, removed from antitrust
perview collective restrictive conduct when that conduct is subject to specific gov-
ernmental control and review."61
In Canada, restraint of trade law has been inconsistent in its treatment of col-
lective conduct. Canadian law requires that the prosecutor first establish that a
restraint has had an "undue" effect." 7 The consequence is that conduct which is
fundamentally without competitive or efficiency justification is allowed to occur
because of the failure to satisfy this irrelevant requirement.""8 Thus, even a cartel
may defend itself as not "undue." 9 In addition, the Canadian courts have devel-
oped no guidelines to inform business when such cartel exploitation of power will
or will not be undue. In contrast to these ambiguous rules, Canada also has a
statute which condemns vertical price agreements as illegal per se apparently with-
out regard to any ancillary justification. 70 From this one may infer that there is no
60. Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, P1. 1, 74 YALE L. J. 775 (1965).
61. Plymouth Dealers Ass'n of N. Cal. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
62. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1965).
64. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Conti-
nental TV Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36 (1977), rev'g Arnold, Schwinn & Co. v. United States,
supra note 63.
65. See, e.g., Catalano,lnc. v. Target Sales, Inc. 446 U.S. 643 (1980)(per curiam); California Retail
Liquor Dealers v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
66. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); National Ass'n of Securities Dealers v. United
States, 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
67. Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-23 § 32 (1970). See Note, R. Abi/ib,, A Reconjd-
era/ion of the "Per Se" Doctrine under the Combines Investiaton Act, 10 McGi.LL L. J. 385 (1964).
68. One amendment to Canadian law may have had the effect of requiring more evidence of actual
effect. Brecher, Combines and Competition. A Re-Appraisel of Canadian Publi Polic, 38 CAN. BAR. REV. 523,
590-91 (1960).
69. See Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. v. Att. Gen. of Canada, 54 C.C.C. (2d) 373, (Can. S.Ct. 1980)
(tacit agreement lessened competition but this was not undue).
70. Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-23 § 38(3) (1970). See Comment, Resale Price
Maintenance in Canada and the United States, 4 TEX. INT'L L. F. 156 (1968).
COMPETITION POICY
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
fundamental objection to a rule which generally forbids naked restraints. 7'
Mexican law also has sanctions against collusive restrictive behavior. Here, the
rules apply to restrictive terms in contracts by which technology is imported into
the country.7 2 Restrictions on the buyer's subsequent use of that technology are
generally forbidden. Thus, these rules are aimed primarily at predatory contract
restraints. The Mexican Constitution and antitrust statute also suggest opposition
to exploitative restraints. 73 Given the substantial direct control over prices, a lesser
concern to prohibit agreements to engage in exploitative conduct is understanda-
ble.
At a very general level, a consistent policy against restraints of freedom of trad-
ers to make their own decisions exists in all three countries. Unfortunately, some
restraints may be the unavoidable incident of achieving efficient integration of
productive or distributive processes. Two approaches are feasible. First, the coun-
tries could forbid collective conduct of specific sorts unless registered and ap-
proved. The bases for approval should be spelled out in terms of effects on
competition, efficiency gains and effects on designated common interests or values.
Such a system could approve restraints whether predatory or exploitative, naked
or ancillary. The approving agency would retain power to order revision of the
agreements whenever the public interest required and could also review specific
decisions or conduct pursuant to such agreements. The model of registration, ap-
proval and continuing regulation is that found in the European Economic Com-
munity treaty and, to some extent, in Mexican law.7 4
The second alternative is the American and Canadian approach which creates
general prohibitions on classes of restraints. The defense of state action limits that
prohibition. Thus, where a member country makes an affirmative decision favor-
ing noncompetition in a particular area, and such a decision is not ultra vires, the
restraints are immune from antitrust sanction.7 5
The latter approach still leaves open the question of the criteria for judging
those restraints which government action does not immunize. From Taft's opinionin United States v. Aayslon Pipe & Steel Co. 76 to the present, American judges and
commentators have generally endorsed the idea that judging the reasonableness of
an action intended only to eliminate competition (e.g., a cartel) is not feasible.
Canada's history of trying to perform this analysis suggests that such a conclusion
is entirely justified. Therefore, if the decision is to subject all restrictive agreements
71. The unfortunate statutory language and judical confusion as to what constitutes an agreement in
some situations complicates the general trend in this direction. See Brecher, supra note 68; Reschenthaler &
Stanbury, Oligopoy and Conscious Parallelism: Theog, Pohy and ihe Canadian Cases, 15 OSGOODE HAi. L. J.
617 (1977); Note, supra note 67.
72. Technology Transfer Law, supra note 21, at art. 7.
73. Mexican Monopoly Law, supra note 19; Mexican Constitution, supra note 18, at art. 28.
74. See Mexican Monopoly Law, supra note 19; Technology Transfer Law, supra 21, at art. 8.
75. Cf Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963) (specific delegation to private decisions of
power without regulatory review immune from antitrust review so long as conduct confined to the specific
authorization); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (restraints not subject to antitrust law
because subject to continued state administrative review).
76. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modfi ed&a fd 175 U.S. 211
(1899).
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(except those protected by state action) to after-the-fact review, the American
model of per se illegality for all naked restraints and a rule based on the ancillarity
and resulting reasonableness of any restrictiveness in any other agreement would
appear to be the most feasible approach. This approach does not entirely forbid
purely anticompetitive agreements. It does remit such conduct to the legislative
process at the outset. The legislature can determine whether or not such restric-
tion is in the public interest and, if so, it can impose whatever public interest re-
view is suitable for the situation.
The second approach also minimizes the need for continual public involve-
ment in and review of business decisions. A system of registration and prior ap-
proval inherently involves the assigned agency in a continual process of bargaining
with business over the exact nature of each collective agreement. This often pro-
duces extensive regulation of internal business affairs---conduct which serves no
useful social purpose. Moreover, such intervention might adversely affect the dy-
namic vigor of business enterprise.7 7 If a robust, competitive and dynamic econ-
omy is the ultimate objective, the proper stance of antitrust should be as little
intervention as is feasible.
Experience with public utility regulation suggests that public agencies will not
or cannot administer private restraints in the public interest. Indeed, the recent
deregulation of American banking, air travel and ground transportation was
aimed at freeing huge industries from inefficient cartel constraints imposed by gov-
ernment regulators nominally in the public interest. These considerations point
toward a preferrence for the second approach in dealing with combinations in
restraints of trade.
C. Merger
Canada, Mexico and the United States all recognize that mergers, as well as
other acquisitions of corporate or other business assets, are events which can be
and, in some circumstances, ought to be objects of government regulation. In the
United States such regulation is almost exclusively based upon competitive consid-
erations. The only generally applicable statutory control is that of the Clayton
Act, which forbids mergers that may tend to lessen competition or to create a
monopoly.7 8 The result has been a judicially mandated set of rules which create
presumptive condemnation for vertical and horizontal mergers involving more
than minimal market shares. 79 Combinations involving less direct likelihood of
competitive effect, i.e., mergers involving conglomeration or potential competition,
are generally lawful absent proof of a significant specific likelihood of anticompeti-
tive effect.8 0
The Canadian and Mexican concern with merger is quite different. Canada
77. B. KLEIN, DYNAMIC ECONOMICS (1977).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
79. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. Philadelphia Bank, 374
U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). But see, e.g., United States v.
General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1975) (presumption overcome on facts of case).
80. See, e.g., FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,
380 U.S. 592 (1965). Many major mergers are never even challenged. See, e.g., Kraar, General Electrtc s Ver
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presently has a crimninal statute outlawing merger which lessens or is likely to
lessen competition "to the detriment . . .of the public.8' Only six prosecutions
have occurred under this provision, from its adoption in 1910 to 1978, and the
government lost all of the cases.8 2 In order to prevail the government must show
not a risk of monopoly prices but a risk of specific harmful effect. 83 Mexican law is
even less clear on this point, but the 1934 statute's prohibition of anticompetitive
agreements could arguably reach anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. 8 4 In
contrast, both countries subject acquisitions of domestic businesses by foreign in-
terests to explicit and extensive review.8 - In part, the motivation for such review is
whether competition is served. Thus, such acquisitions are objectionable in those
instances where they may have anticompetitive effect. 86
The size of the Mexican and Canadian economics is crucial to an understand-
ing of the lack of strong domestic merger control. Neither economy is nearly as
large as that of the United States. The economic arguments for merger, te., that it
permits efficient consolidation of productive resources, make far more sense in the
context of small markets than in a market of more than 200 million consumers.8 7
Consequently, the policies governing isolated national economics do not necessar-
ily suggest that similar policies would govern if the economic context were larger.
Assuming a policy in which mergers are regulated for competitive reasons, a
primary source of guidance will be the American experience. There is, however,
no consensus on the merits of the American merger law. Critics suggest that the
connection between market structure and conduct is a very weak one, so that in-
hibiting consolidation in fact has little or no effect on conduct variables such as
price cost margins.m Critics are even more hostile toward attempts to control
mergers when the firms are not actual or potential competitors. Thus, vertical
mergers are said to produce no change in market structure, and so involve no
Personal Merger, FORTUNE, Aug., 1977, at 187 (describing GE-Utah Mining Merger worth several billion
dollars).
81. Combines Investigation Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. C-23 § 2 (1970).
82. Stanbury, Stage IIAmendments: An Overview in CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at
55, 62.
83. See Regina v. K.C. Irving Ltd., 45 D.L.R. (3d) 45 (1974); Regina v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., 126
C.C.C. 133 (Ont. High Ct. 1969); Reschenthaler & Stanbury, A. Clarifation of Canadian Merger Pohy, 22
ANTITRUST BULL. 673 (1977); Roberts, The Death of Competition Poliy. Monopoly, Merger and Regina v. K.C
Irving Ltd., 16 UNIV. WEST. ONT. L. REV. 215 (1978).
84. Mexican Monopoly Law, supra note 19, at art. 4(ii). See also, id. at art. 4(i), (iii).
85. See Foreign Investment Code, supra note 4 (Mexico); Foreign Investment Act, supra note 10 (Ca-
nada).
86. Foreign Investment Code, supra note 4, at art. 13(x), (xiii) (Mexico); Foreign Investment Act, supra
note 10, at § 2(2)(c)(Canada). The primary purpose is however to protect and promote domestic owner-
ship. There is also in these laws regulation of foreign de novo entry, which has a stronger aspect of protec-
tionism for local businesses.
87. Canadian evidence is, however, that these effects do not occur. Thompson, Mergers, Effects, and
Competition Policy: Some Emperical Evidence, in CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 297-328.
This failure is partly explained by the advantage of retaining local monopoly often in conglomerate form.
See Leff, 'Monopoy Capitahsm'and Public Polic in Developig Countries, 32 KYKLoS 718 (1979).
88. Demsetz, Two Systems of Behef About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: TIlE NEW
LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974).
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appreciable risk to competition.8 9 Similarly, conglomerate mergers, which involve
no existing or potential market relationships between the combining firms, argua-
bly involve no immediate appreciable competitive risks.9 Other schools of
thought hold that expansive antimerger rules have been a significant factor since
the mid-1950s in the preservation of fairly constant or even slightly declining levels
of concentration in specific markets, and that this has in turn produced a more
competitive and dynamic economy than might otherwise have existed.9 '
Despite this controversy, it is clear that American antimerger policy has had no
substantial negative effect on efficiency. The critics argue only that the rules have
not acted to enhance competition. Some, simplistically, then conclude that such
rules must have anticompetitive effect. But both Canadian and American analysts
have convincingly demonstrated that many mergers occur for reasons other than
efficacy, 92 and no direct evidence of inefficiency resulting from forbidden mergers
exists. In at least one industry, an observer has suggested that the effect was posi-
tive.9 3
Given the small effect of merger on competition and economic efficiency, one
might conclude that this aspect of economic behavior can be ignored. Still, if no
law existed, late 19th-century American and more recent Canadian experience
suggests that merger to monopoly or oligiopoly could occur. So long as national
laws are left in place and firms freely compete in all three nations, the result will be
that American antimerger law will have a dominating effect on the overall reor-
ganization of assets by merger. However, the better course would be to provide
explicit regional merger rules. Expanding the size of the competitive market is at
the core of the desirability of economic integration; since it is generally agreed that
merger can produce anticompetitive results, some control is desirable. This is espe-
cially true where some of the nations involved have policies forbidding or control-
ling foreign acquisition of domestic assets and where some mergers in one country
could have their primary competitive effect in other countries. One major advan-
tage of an agreement on merger is that it could designate those classes of mergers
(e.g., mergers involving enterprises having substantial assets in, or whose business
significantly affects, more than one country of the group) to which such rules
would apply.
Any merger rule would have to include a ban on mergers among substantial
competitors within the region in the absence of a compelling justification.9 4 Rules
89. Bork, Vertical Integration and the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an Economic Misconception, 22 U.
CHI. L. REV. 157 (1954).
90. E.g., Coase, Working Paper for the Task Force on Productivi'y and Competition.- The Conglomerate Merger,
115 CONG. REC. 15938 (1969).
91. Mueller, The Celler-Kefauver Act: The First 17 Years, SUBCOMM. ON MONOPOLIES AND COMMER-
CIAL LAW OF TE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CON;., 2D SEsS. (Comm. Print 28, 1978).
92. See Thompson, Mergers, Efect, and Competition Policy: Some Emperical Evidence, in CANADIAN COMPE-
TrnON POLICY, supra note 12, at 297; P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, E'FECTS, POLICIES (1975).
93. Elzinga, The Beer Industr in STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 189, 202-03 (4th ed. W. Adams
1971).
94. Compelling justification tests, when rigorously enforced, rarely result in the allowance of mergers.
See e.g., Citizens Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (rejecting failing firm defense be-
cause other buyers existed); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 390 U.S. 171 (1968) (rejecting
convenience and needs defense for bank merger).
COMPETITION POLICY
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
barring substantial vertical combinations while somewhat questionable in static
economic theory, have the effect of creating added incentives for new vertical
expansion, which tends to produce larger numbers of competing firms and to max-
imize competition in intermediate stage markets. The basic approach that Ameri-
can experience suggests is to condemn all mergers above stated guideline market
shares unless a compelling justification is proven.95 Introducing more extensive
specific analysis of individual mergers will produce little useful refinement in
thinking or analysis but will entail great delay, confusion and obscurity.96
Also worth consideration would be two rules, one which would bar combina-
tions between large firms engaged in the same or similar activities even if not com-
petitiors at the time of merger and another which would forbid the merger of very
large enterprises regardless of competitive effect. The first proposal would govern
the area now encompassed by the ineffective potential competition doctrine.9 7 In
moving to a more integrated North American economy, many firms will confront
competition, actual or potential, from new sources. During the evolution of this
new expanded market, it is especially desirable that large firms be notified that
they can neither conspire with nor merge with emerging competitors in order to
suppress the potential for more vigorous competition.
The second suggested rule forbidding mergers of large enterprises aims at con-
glomerate mergers and has both economic and political justification. Economi-
cally, such a rule acts to direct investment toward new enterprise and away from
mere acquisition.98 It also acts to increase the aggregate number of economic ac-
tors aiding the overall dynamics of the economy. 99 As a political matter, this rule
keeps economic power more decentralized, thus at least marginally protecting the
political order from undue distortion. 1°
D. The Source and Shape of Regional Antitrust Policy
The foregoing suggestions have repeatedly urged the adoption of key aspects of
American antitrust doctrine as basic regional policy. While in part this may reflect
the bias and limitation of one knowledgeable primarily in that system, it is also
true that America has had the broadest and most intensive experience with anti-
trust law. Moreover, America's vast size and wealth provide a better approxima-
tion to the regional market being considered than do those of Mexico or Canada.
If American antitrust law is a key inspiration, it need not be slavishly followed.
95. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); United States v. Continental Can
Corp. 378 U.S. 441 (1964). See also United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
96. For one such proposal, see Quinn, Institutional Design and Canadian Merge Pollcy in CANADIAN COM-
PETITION PoLiCY, supra note 12, at 269. The problem with employing such a multifactor analysis particu-
larly when the factors are unweighted and subjective, is that specific results can and will appear random.
97. United States v. Marine Bar Corp., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F2d 24 (2nd
Cir. 1977); R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 113-25 (1976); Bradley, Potential
Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L. J. 1 (1977).
98. See Leff, supra note 87.
99. B. KLEIN, supra note 77.
100. Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555 (1973); Carstensen &
Questal, The Use of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers, 63 COR-
NELL L. REV. 841 (1978).
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Thus, although American courts employ rules of presumptive illegality against all
horizontal agreements regardless of their ancillarity and condemn vertical price
fixing, there is no reason to expand the application of these rules to the region as a
whole. Similarly, the American challenge to purely structural monopoly is not an
essential element in a regional antitrust policy.
The central organizing principle of American antitrust law is an incompletely
articulated ideal that a society dependent upon voluntary market transactions
should never tolerate the private creation, possession or retention of more eco-
nomic power than is reasonably necessary to achieve productive efficiency. Thus,
restrictive agreements which act only to create or regulate market power are illegal
per se, while all others are judged by the necessity for their anticompetitive effect
in achieving economic efficiency. In monopoly, the same pattern obtains: conduct
whose primary function or effect is to disrupt competition in other markets or to
eliminate competition within a market is always objectionable and is fundamen-
tally without excuse or justification. Only when the conduct at issue achieves so-
cially useful results does the process of evaluation become more difficult. Finally,
in the merger area, rules which forbid the merging of large firms draw substantial
support from repeated theoretical and empirical studies which show that negative
efficiency effects are very unlikely. At the same time, an antimerger policy keeps
the economic power inherent in large business enterprise dispersed.
The central principle of limiting market power and forbidding its gratuitous
creation implies that there must be rules of broad inflexible prohibition on conduct
whose only function is to achieve such ends. All three countries agree on the fun-
damental truth of this proposition; it is in both statutory and decisional applica-
tion where confusion and deviation have emerged. Only if the central principle of
regulating a competitive market economy is recognized and consistently imple-
mented will the advantages of such a market flow in the optimal degree and direc-
tion.
III
ENFORCEMENT OF REGIONAL COMPETITION POLICY
The choice of methods for enforcement of regional competitive policy is likely
to produce as much disagreement as do the substantive rules. The enforcement
problem involves many choices, one of which concerns the character of the public
enforcement agency or agencies: should there be a regional agency or should na-
tional agencies undertake this additional burden? Another important choice in-
volves the method by which policy will be enforced; this includes the choice
between administrative and judicial enforcement modes, as well as the choice be-
tween criminal and civil liability. There is the question of the relationship be-
tween regional enforcement and national enforcement programs, as well as the
relationship between national programs. Another question concerns the creation
of some regional forum to review decisions, however made, which affect regional
interests. There is the choice of role for private litigation: should regional law
allow such actions; if so, should the plaintiff be entitled to injunctive or damage
relief; and if damage relief is available, how should it be measured? Existing
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choices among the three countries show a lack of consensus on all of these issues.
The following discussion can raise only some of the enforcement concerns.
A. Public Enforcement
Three of the issues previously identified involve the public enforcement of com-
petition policy. The most basic question is who will perform this function. The
obvious alternatives are the existing national agencies or a new regional agency.
Inherently, enforcement of regional policy on competition will require a broad
regional view of competitive effects and is likely to entail conflict with powerful
economic interests in the several countries. In addition, a significant aspect of im-
plementing regional policy may well involve advocacy of regional competitive pol-
icy to national agencies; this is a difficult burden to assign to national agencies.
Finally, it is doubtful that Mexico presently employs an agency with a mandate
confined to enforcing competitive policy as such. All of these reasons suggest the
creation of a regional enforcement agency.
A regional agency need not be large. Its size and scope would be a function of
the rules which it is to enforce. Many of the policies and rules that any regional
agency would implement would also be the subject of parallel action by national
agencies. In such cases, the regional agency need play only a secondary role to
insure that regional policies are properly considered. Another issue involves the
operation of the enforcement process. The choice is between a rule-oriented and at
least quasi-judicial proceeding"'0 or a nonadversarial administrative approach
similar to the Mexican administative procedures.
Use of the adversarial rule-based approach permits employing a professional
judiciary to decide specific cases. Job security and separation from immediate
political concerns would allow such decision-makers, if properly informed,10 2 to
apply policy more effectively than administrative agency members whose tenure
and position is directly subject to political control. A select group of skillful and
knowledgeable judges can handle such cases in more neutral and therefore accept-
able terms.
As long as the focus of an enforcement agency is restricted to the promotion of
a competitive policy, the adversarial approach is preferable; however, at a regional
level, there must also be a balance between promotion of competition and other
concerns such as promotion of technological development, protection of specific
politically favored economic interests, or reallocation of wealth, ownership or con-
trol of productive assets. The balancing of such concerns is not feasible in a judi-
cial forum. The Mexican model of agencies, which draw their leadership from a
range of key ministries and then make political-administrative determinations
based on nonadversarial proceedings, constitutes the proper model for such a bal-
ancing task.
101. The American system employs the FTC, an administrative agency, and the Justice Department,
but both operate within a quasi-judicial, rule-oriented framework. Canadian law enforcement is somewhat
similarly structured.
102. The Canadian experience demonstrates the risks of an ill-informed judicary. See Roberts, supra
note 83; Reschenthaler, supra note 71.
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It is questionable, however, whether such integration should occur at -the ad
hoc level of particular case decisions. To bring the Mexican approach, based on a
small economy, a strong central government and a limited private arena, to a
regional administration would be doubtful as an efficient administrative choice
and as a sound political strategy. When specific decisions take account of too
many divergent policies, observers get the impression of either randomness or arbi-
trariness in policy execution. To assure public support and effective policy imple-
mentation enforcement, agencies need fairly clear mandates. The integration of
competition and other policies should occur in the legislative context, which must
remain flexible and responsive.
One other argument favoring administrative over judicial enforcement de-
serves brief mention. An administrative regime can handle regulation of cartel or
other naked restraints in a way which judicial processes cannot. To the extent that
the substantive rules allow cartel behavior some administrative regime will be es-
sential.
Although an adversarial rule-oriented approach to competition can employ
criminal as well as civil sanctions, it would not be advisable to employ overtly
criminal sanctions in a regional enforcement program. Great difficulty arises in
defining criminal conduct, as the earlier substantive discussion showed; many ac-
tions and situations are undesirable only some of the time. Moreover, civil penal-
ties and injunctions can achieve most of what criminal sanctions could accomplish.
This is especially true if firms are also subject to national law sanctions.
Lastly, there is the question of who will review decisions. If an adversarial
approach is employed, the arena would expand to include the making of such
initial decisions. Clearly, several possibilities exist: cases could be heard or re-
viewed in national courts; a new regional judiciary could be created, possibly
drawn from the judiciary of the participating countries; or, especially if initial de-
cisions are administrative, review could be in some legislative or executive political
forum. Providing for judicial review seems preferable because it ensures that spe-
cific matters will be decided pursuant to explicit rules. Political review can occur
through rule changes which could have retroactive effect. In addition, public en-
forcement efforts through governmental agencies would themselves be subject to
political control. Even if the basic enforcement process is nonadversarial, with
attendant political review, judicial review remains feasible to test the consistency
of a specific decision with general rules and policy. 10 3 This suggests that some
regional judicial review exist, not only in cases involving review of a regional en-
forcement agency, but also in cases from national courts involving significant re-
gional issues. If such a court is not needed for regional purposes, it could most
easily be created from panels of judges drawn from the national judiciaries.
B. Private Actions
A second major enforcement subject concerns the role of private parties as di-
103. See D. BAROUNOS, D. HALL, J. JAMES, EEC ANTITRUST LAW PRINCIPI.ES AND PRACTICi-" ch. 12
(1975); Smit, Recent Developments in the EEC-Antitrust and the Court ofJustice 28 AM. J. COMP. L. 334 (1980).
Cf. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234 (1978).
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rect litigants. Through a variety of informal means, private parties can seek to
have public agencies invoke the law against competitors, suppliers and customers
to whose conduct they object. Such solicitation may not be adequate. It filters
through a review process which has a stated and actual concern to promote the
public interest in the matters it reviews, but the public interest in challenging con-
duct devastating to an individual firm may be slight. Moreover, enforcement pri-
orities and the personal views of the leadership of the public agency and its staff'
1 4
will help determine which cases receive attention. Finally, the pyramidal charac-
ter of public decision-making means all final decisions must pass through a very
limited number of top officials. Such a process can slow down the speed of action.
Comparison of Canadian and American experience demonstrates the implica-
tions of limiting enforcement to public agencies. While in neither country is pub-
lic litigation frequent, 10 5 antitrust rules are more effective in America because of
the private rights of actions. No one decision-maker or organization has a monop-
oly over implementing the statutory commands. Indeed, Canadian policy analysts
have identified the lack of significant private rights of action as a primary reason
for the underdevelopment of Canadian competition law. 10 6
Critics of private antitrust enforcement assert that the private cause of action
includes many incentives which are not consistent with the public interest objec-
tives of antitrust law. 10 7 To a significant extent, reformulation of private actions
can ensure that private interest in litigation does correspond to a public interest in
preserving or promoting competition. For example, American courts are now for-
mulating more exactly the entitlement to damages guaranteeing a closer relation-
ship between the right to damages and the underlying anticompetitive conduct.'"
In addition, public agencies can affect private litigation through intervention in
cases in an effort to advise the court of their views. Such intervention provides the
judge with a more complete range of alternatives and a more dispassionate analy-
sis of the merits of the matter. This is especially important in matters of remedy.
On balance, the advantages of allowing private actions appear to outweigh the
disadvantages. The contrast between the United States and Canada strongly sup-
ports the conclusion that effective implementation of competition policy requires
much policing of the market. Creating carefully defined private actions will facili-
tate this greatly. Any significant reliance on private action for enforcement would
require that regional competition policy be codified in the form of rules and not
104. The role of staffs in controlling antitrust agency conduct is discussed in S. WEAVER, DECISION
TO PROSECUTE: ORGANIZATION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN THE ANTITRUST DIVISION (1977). See also R.
KATZMAN, REGULATORY BUREAUCRACY: THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND ANTITRUST POLICY
(1979).
105. Gorecki & Stanbury, Canada "r Combines Inoestiation Act. The Record of Public Law Enforcement, /889-
/976 in CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY, supra note 12, at 135; Posner, A Slatstical Sludy of Anotirusi En-
forcement, 13 J. L. & ECON 365 (1970).
106. McDonald, Privale Actions and the Combines Investigation Act in CANADIAN COMPETITION POLICY,
supra note 12, at 195; Prichard, Private Enforcement and Class Actions in CANADIAN COMPETITION PO)LICY,
supra note 12, at 217.
107. W. BREIT & K. ELZINGA, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES: A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMIcS, 63-
76 (1976).
108. See Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efticency: An Approach to Antitrust ojury, 47 U. Ct I. L.
REV. 467 (1980).
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left to nonadversary administrative actions. Thus private enforcement does tend
to push the choice of general public enforcement toward the adversarial model.
Private enforcement need not necessitate a regional forum; it would be possible
to leave such claims to national courts. The regional agreement would define the
scope of private claims for violation of the regional rules, giving national courts the
duty of implementation. This solution is attractive because, in many instances,
claims might be made under national law as well, at least, if the action arose in the
United States or Canada. The only necessary limitation to national court disposi-
tion is that rulings applying substantive standards of liability or remedy ought to
be reviewable by some regional judicial agency.
What damages should a regional private damage right provide? American law
provides for trebling.'0 9 The rationale for this is deterrence. The prospect of los-
ing three times the gain or the harm to the victim (whichever is greater), should
eliminate most incentives to engage in such conduct, as long as an actor believes
that there is a reasonable likelihood of being detected. The most valid criticism of
the treble damage rule arises when it is invoked to challenge behavior which had
not previously constituted a violation of antitrust law, or when the judgment of
violation emerged only after a careful and close assessment of the reasonableness of
specific behavior. The unfairness of the trebling in these contexts is that its deter-
rent effect is aimed at conduct which may well not need deterring or may create a
general paralysis of will among businesses.
An alternative to eliminating treble damages entirely would be to set some
limits to the situations in which such a rule could be invoked. Selective denial of
trebling might provide reasonable assurance to potential defendants without seri-
ously impairing the effectiveness of the overall deterrent. Such denial could occur
where the defendant makes a convincing showing of the novelty of the plaintiff's
theory or of the general reasonableness of his own conduct, even if in some specifics
the result was to violate the law. Such an exemption from trebling would not do
away with the duty to pay actual damages.
Despite the deterrent value of treble damages, it appears unlikely that such a
remedy would be authorized as a matter of regional agreement. Again, as long as
national law rights remain unimpaired, most regional offenses would also offend
American law and therefore, to at least some degree, would be subject to treble
damage claims.
Should private parties be allowed to seek injunctive relief in addition to dam-
ages? The primary risk here is that such relief creates a temptation to seek an-
ticompetitive outcomes. At the same time, if private parties have the right to
obtain prospective relief, it is easier to refuse damages in close cases. Ensuring that
a proposed injunction is itself procompetitive and not anticompetitive requires a
reasonable degree of judicial sophistication in administering relief. The public
agency could also review any settlement or injunctive proposal affecting future
competition.
109. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
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C. Relating National and Regional Laws and Enforcement
American antitrust law asserts the right to reach transactions in foreign coun-
tries which affect American commerce.' "-° Such extraterritorial jurisdiction is the
source of conflicts between the United States and other countries, including Ca-
nada. Canada has adopted laws which limit both investigation and ultimate lia-
bility of Canadian enterprises for what America would regard as a violation of its
law.' " One issue which regional integration must resolve is the allocation of en-
forcement rights in such situations.
Presumably, the presence of a regional enforcement system, employing agreed-
upon policies, ought to provide a substitute for some extraterritorial national ac-
tion. This raises the question of the jurisdictional limits for the regional agency.
The deeper the agency's penetration into matters which only affect regional com-
merce indirectly, the greater the need for a detailed reconciliation of policy objec-
tives. Practical politics suggests that jurisdiction of the regional agency and
regional rules should be limited to situations that directly involve the flow of goods
or services between member countries.
There is also the problem of relating national and regional enforcement. Rules
of either primary or exclusive jurisdiction are needed. A primary-jurisdiction ap-
proach would establish a sequence of review over a situation with both national
and regional agencies having vetoes. Approval would require that all affected
agencies acquiesce. Exclusive jurisdiction would assign complete decisional au-
thority to one level, preempting all others. Exclusive jurisdiction is not inconsis-
tent with active participation by other agencies in the designated forum. The
strongest objection to a general rule of exclusive jurisdiction is the great difficulty
in assigning unambiguous authority. Transactions of regional interest inherently
involve multiple claims of legitimate right to review. This suggests that a primary-
jurisdiction approach may generally be the more feasible alternative. Still, in cases
where a situation involves firms the bulk of whose assets are located in a single
country but whose conduct significantly affects other jurisdictions, it may be neces-
sary to preempt any extraterritorial jurisdictional claim for the laws of the
nondomicile (but affected) jurisdiction, and to allow primary jurisdiction to rest in
the regional agency and confer secondary jurisdiction with the domicile. Such an
approach ought to resolve some of the conflicts between America and Canada.
One implication of this approach is that private actions would also be limited to
domicile or regional claims. Where there are American victims of Canadian or
Mexican anticompetitive conduct, a limitation of existing rights would result. In
employing a primary-jurisdiction approach, difficult situations could develop
where national and regional interests conflict. Ultimately, regional agreement will
determine the scope of rights to act which are contrary to common policy. But
within any such right, the regional competition agency can undertake a program
of advocacy and education to persuade national agencies to select those alterna-
110. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945); W. FUc;ATE, FOR-
EIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS (2d ed. 1970).
111. See ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (No. 973) A-19 (1979).
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tives which are more consistent with regional policy. Thus, to the extent that na-
tions retain the right to reject nonnational buyers of domestic enterprises or
entrants into domestic business, those rights ought to be exercised in accord with
preserving and promoting regional competition. The regional competiton agency
is a well-located advocate for such a viewpoint.
IV
CONCLUSION
The problems of creating a common North American policy on competition
and antitrust are many. This review suggests that the greater problems are more
likely to emerge in selecting the instruments of enforcement and in relating compe-
tition policy to existing controls over markets, than in the selection of substantive
rules. There may, nevertheless, be a temptation in creating agreement to try indi-
rectly to achieve that which could never be accomplished directly: the elimination
of controls over the competitive market. This temptation must be resisted. A
functionally competitive market is fragile and continually threatened. It can not
flourish without an explicit effort to ensure its existence. Regional economic inte-
gration which failed to provide effectively for such protection would, in the long
run, fail to produce the economic advantages which it could achieve.
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